Legislating After Janice M.: the Constitutionality of Recognizing De Facto Parenthood in Maryland by Simmonsen, Rachel
Maryland Law Review
Volume 70 | Issue 2 Article 16
Legislating After Janice M.: the Constitutionality of
Recognizing De Facto Parenthood in Maryland
Rachel Simmonsen
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons, Legal Education Commons, and the Legal Profession
Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rachel Simmonsen, Legislating After Janice M.: the Constitutionality of Recognizing De Facto Parenthood in Maryland, 70 Md. L. Rev. 525
(2011)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol70/iss2/16
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-2\MLR214.txt unknown Seq: 1 18-MAR-11 7:30
Comment
LEGISLATING AFTER JANICE M.: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF RECOGNIZING DE FACTO PARENTHOOD
IN MARYLAND
RACHEL SIMMONSEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Maya had three mothers.  She knew two of them.  The law saw
only one.  Before Maya was out of diapers, her birth mother was out of
the picture.1  But, two other women soon filled the void.  Maya’s adop-
tive mother, Janice, took the infant from India to Maryland, where
Janice shared a home with her longtime partner, Margaret.2  For five
years, Janice and Margaret shared the duties of bathing Maya, chang-
ing her diapers, preparing Maya’s meals, accompanying her on school
field trips, and driving her to choir practice and horseback riding les-
sons.3  But while Maya considered both women her mother,4 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized Janice alone as a parent.5
Only Janice had legally adopted Maya,6 and thus, only she had the
Copyright  2011 by Rachel Simmonsen.
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1. See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 665–66, 948 A.2d 73, 75–76 (2008) (not-
ing that Maya was still a baby when Janice adopted her and brought her to the United
States).
2. Id. at 665, 948 A.2d at 75.
3. Id. at 666, 948 A.2d at 76; Janice M. v. Margaret K., 171 Md. App. 528, 531, 910 A.2d
1145, 1147 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006), rev’d, 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73 (2008); see also
Andrea F. Siegel, “De Facto” Parent’s Visitation on Trial: High Court to Hear Plea of Ex-Partner to
See Adopted Girl, BALT. SUN, May 30, 2007, at 1B (noting that “Margaret helped Janice raise
her daughter—preparing breakfast, picking her up at school, ferrying her to medical ap-
pointments and bathing her”).
4. See Janice M., 171 Md. App. at 532–33, 910 A.2d at 1148 (finding that Plaintiff’s
Verified Emergency Motion for Visitation, which included copies of Mother’s Day and
“Mommy” birthday cards, written by Janice from Maya to Margaret, “overwhelmingly estab-
lish[ed]” a “parent-child bond” between Maya and Margaret).
5. See Janice M., 404 Md. at 685, 948 A.2d at 87 (refusing to recognize de facto
parenthood in Maryland and thus deeming Margaret K. a third party, rather than a parent,
to Maya).
6. Id. at 665 & n.2, 948 A.2d at 75 & n.2.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland noted
that India’s prohibition of adoptions by same-sex couples prevented Margaret from taking
525
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right to custody of the child after Janice and Margaret ended their
eighteen year relationship.7
The facts of Janice M. v. Margaret K.8 illustrate an increasingly
common dilemma facing state courts and lawmakers: How should the
law address child custody and visitation disputes in nontraditional
families?  As of 2000, same-sex couples were parents to more than
250,000 children under the age of eighteen nationwide.9  By 2004, the
U.S. Census Bureau estimated that about seventeen percent of chil-
dren lived in blended families with one or no biological parents and/
or stepparents, stepsiblings, or half siblings.10  In 2009, more than two
million children in the United States lived with one parent and that
parent’s unmarried partner.11
Although family law routinely divides parental rights among di-
vorcing heterosexual parents, it has yet to apply a similar, consistent
framework to the dissolution of nontraditional families.12  Some
courts and lawmakers have embraced aspects of a proposal offered by
the American Law Institute (“ALI”).13  In recognizing de facto
part in Maya’s formal adoption. Id. at 665 n.2, 948 A.2d at 75 n.2; see also Janice M., 171 Md.
App. at 531, 910 A.2d at 1147.  Margaret never sought to legally adopt Maya in Maryland.
Janice M., 404 Md. at 665, 948 A.2d at 75.  Although same-sex couples have obtained sec-
ond-parent adoptions in Maryland, see Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 336, 932 A.2d 571,
642 (2007) (Raker, J., concurring in part and dissenting) (noting that Maryland “trial
courts have granted same-sex couples ‘second parent adoptions’”), the Court of Appeals
has yet to rule on the legality of such adoptions, Janice M., 404 Md. at 665 n.3, 948 A.2d at
75 n.3.
7. See Janice M., 404 Md. at 664, 948 A.2d at 75 (explaining that although the women
had shared a committed relationship for about eighteen years, Margaret was not entitled to
custody of Maya because Maryland does not recognize de facto parenthood).
8. 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73.
9. R. BRADLEY SEARS ET AL., SAME-SEX COUPLES AND SAME-SEX COUPLES RAISING CHIL-
DREN IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM CENSUS 2000, at 1 (2005).
10. ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 2004,
at 2 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p70-114.pdf.
11. America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2009, U.S. Census Bureau, tbl. C3 (2009),
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2009.html.
12. See Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 635 (2002) (“The law gov-
erning . . . relationships [between children and nontraditional caregivers] is poorly
developed.”).
13. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2000) (finding that psychological
parents stand in parity with legal parents); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176
(Wash. 2005) (holding that an individual establishes standing as a de facto parent if (1) the
legal parent “consented to and fostered [a] parent-like relationship” between the child and
the de facto parent, (2) the de facto parent lived in the same household as the child, (3)
the de facto parent assumed parental duties without compensation, and (4) the de facto
parent served in the parental role for a period of time long enough to have established a
“bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature”); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533
N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (holding that courts may apply the best interests of the child
standard in visitation disputes between a legal parent and a “non-traditional” parental fig-
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-2\MLR214.txt unknown Seq: 3 18-MAR-11 7:30
2011] JANICE M. V. MARGARET K. 527
parenthood, the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution14 bestow
parental rights on individuals who have lived with a child and devel-
oped a parent-like bond with the consent and support of the legal
parent.15  This standard allows individuals, such as same-sex partners
and stepparents, to continue to parent their nonbiological children
once the adults’ romantic relationship has ended.  Nonetheless,
ure, provided that the latter can show that the legal parent “consented to, and fostered,” a
parent-like relationship between the nontraditional parental figure and the child and that
the nontraditional parental figure lived with the child, took on parental obligations with-
out expectation of compensation, and has served “in a parental role for a length of time
sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in
nature”); see also, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257C.08, subdiv. 4 (West 2007) (allowing a per-
son who has lived two or more years with a child to petition for visitation, provided the
petitioner can show that visitation would be in the child’s best interests, the petitioner and
the child shared a “parent and child relationship,” and visitation would not interfere with
the relationship between the custodial parent and the child).  These authorities all draw
from concepts and language in the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. See infra
notes 14–15. R
14. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
15. Section 2.03 of the Principles provides that a de facto parent is
[A]n individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a signif-
icant period of time not less than two years, (i) lived with the child and, (ii) for
reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agreement of a
legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a complete fail-
ure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions, (A) regularly
performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child, or (B) regularly
performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent
with whom the child primarily lived.
Id. § 2.03.  “Parent by estoppel” is defined as
[A]n individual who, though not a legal parent,
(i) is obligated to pay child support . . .; or
(ii) lived with the child for at least two years and (A) over that period had a
reasonable, good-faith belief that he was the child’s biological father, based on
marriage to the mother or on the actions or representations of the mother, and
fully accepted parental responsibilities consistent with that belief, and (B) if some
time thereafter that belief no longer existed, continued to make reasonable,
good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities as the child’s father; or
(iii) lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full
and permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agree-
ment with the child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both par-
ents) to raise a child together each with full parental rights and responsibilities,
when the court finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s
best interests; or
(iv) lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting full and
permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with the child’s
parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents), when the court finds that
recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests.
Id. § 2.03(b).
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courts in many other states have refused to accept de facto
parenthood.16
In Janice M., the Maryland Court of Appeals joined those state
courts rejecting judicial recognition of de facto parenthood, but at
least some state lawmakers hope to override the decision.  In February
2010, legislators introduced companion bills in the Maryland Senate
and House of Delegates to recognize de facto parents upon clear and
convincing evidence of three factors: first, that each parent of the
child had “fostered” a “parent-like” relationship with the child; sec-
ond, that the individual had exercised “parent-like responsibility” for
the child; and third, that the individual had acted in a “parent-like
role for a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded and
dependent relationship” with the child that is “parental in nature.”17
Under this proposed legislation, de facto parents would have had “the
duties and obligations” of a legal parent.18  Based on Maryland case
law,19 visitation and custody disputes between legal parents and de
facto parents presumably would have turned on the “best interests of
the child” standard, which “triggers a fact-specific inquiry that vests
considerable discretion in the court.”20
Though ultimately unsuccessful,21 the bills proposing recognition
of de facto parent status in Maryland raised an important question:
16. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 307–08, 312–13 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005) (refusing to recognize an individual as a de facto parent, even though he had co-
parented the child since birth); Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that any third party seeking custody, including an individual claiming de facto
parenthood status, must first show that awarding sole custody to the legal parent would
cause the child substantial harm).
17. H.B. 1241(B)(2)(I)–(III), 427th Sess. (Md. 2010); S.B. 600(B)(2)(I)–(III), 427th
Sess. (Md. 2010).  Throughout this Comment, I refer to the bills collectively as “the pro-
posed legislation.”
18. H.B. 1241(C); S.B. 600(C).
19. The Maryland Court of Appeals has said that the best interests of the child standard
applies in custody and visitation disputes between fit legal parents. See, e.g., Janice M. v.
Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 675, 948 A.2d 73, 81 (2008) (identifying “disputes between fit
legal parents” as one of three circumstances in which the best interests of the child stan-
dard might arise).
20. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY
AND PRACTICE 628 (3d ed. 2007).
21. Sponsors of the House Bill withdrew the measure after it received an unfavorable
report from the Judiciary Committee. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, VOTING RECORD ON
H.B. 1241 (March 25, 2010), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2010rs/votes_comm/hb
1241_jud.pdf.  The 2010 Legislative Session came to a close with no action on the Senate
version.  According to Equality Maryland, a gay rights group, both bills were under “serious
attack by lawmakers who want[ed] to amend [them] to include language to take away the
recognition of out of state marriage licenses.” Less than 6 Days Left for LGBT Bills!, EQUALITY
MD. BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010) (on file with the Maryland Law Review).  In February of 2010,
the Maryland Attorney General stated that Maryland may recognize gay marriages per-
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Can Maryland lawmakers constitutionally recognize de facto
parenthood, or was Janice M. the final word?  Though the Court of
Appeals noted lawmakers’ power to legislate the matter, the court re-
served judgment on whether a de facto parenthood statute would be
valid under the Federal Constitution or the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.22
This Comment explores the constitutionality of the proposed Ma-
ryland legislation, analyzing the bills under both the Federal and Ma-
ryland Constitutions.  Part II summarizes the Maryland Court of
Appeals’s opinion in Janice M. and presents more fully the constitu-
tional problem facing Maryland lawmakers.  Part III focuses on the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States and its im-
plications for de facto parenthood and concludes that the proposed
legislation would have been valid under the Federal Constitution.
Part IV then explores potential problems under the Maryland Consti-
tution and concludes that if lawmakers reintroduce the proposed leg-
islation, they should amend it to more effectively balance the
constitutional rights of legal and de facto parents.  Despite the fact
that the Court of Appeals provided little guidance on how to legislate
the rights of legal and de facto parents constitutionally, Maryland
lawmakers must move forward and enact statutory language that rec-
ognizes de facto parents in Maryland.  This legislation is particularly
important in protecting the rights of same-sex partners, as Maryland
has yet to legalize same-sex marriage or determine officially whether
same-sex couples may adopt.23
II. JANICE M.: RAISING MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS
Were it not for the timing of the proposed legislation on de facto
parenthood, Margaret K.’s request for de facto parent status might
have escaped serious constitutional inquiry by the Maryland Court of
Appeals.  Maryland courts generally presume the constitutionality of
statutes, reasoning that the “adequacy of the legislative scheme is for
the Legislature to determine.”24  Nonetheless, if the basis for a judicial
decision rests on constitutional guarantees of due process, the legisla-
formed in other states.  95 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 3, 3–4 (2010), available at http://www.oag.
state.md.us/Opinions/2010/95oag3.pdf.
22. Janice M., 404 Md. at 689, 948 A.2d at 89.
23. Maryland lawmakers introduced a bill to recognize same-sex marriage during the
2011 session, but the bill’s likely success remained unclear in early February 2011.  Annie
Linskey & Julie Bykowicz, Six Senators Hold the Key to Passage of Gay-Marriage Bill, BALT. SUN,
Feb. 6, 2011, at 1A.
24. Pitts v. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Psychologists, 222 Md. 224, 227, 160 A.2d 200, 201
(1960).
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ture may not simply pass a law overriding the judicial decision; due
process guarantees, as interpreted by the courts, constrain
lawmakers.25  Thus, had the de facto parenthood bills not come so
soon after the Janice M. case, the proposals may have enjoyed a pre-
sumption of constitutionality.26
In Janice M., the Court of Appeals expressly rejected Margaret’s
argument that Maryland should recognize de facto parenthood,27
even though the lower courts had granted Margaret visitation on that
ground.28  After Janice and Margaret’s split, Janice did not allow Mar-
garet to have any contact with Maya,29 and Margaret subsequently
sued for custody, or in the alternative, visitation.30  The Circuit Court
for Baltimore County granted Janice custody, noting that legal parents
are entitled to a presumption of custody and finding that no evidence
established Janice as an unfit parent or that any extraordinary circum-
stances were present.31  On the matter of visitation, however, the cir-
cuit court found that Margaret was a de facto parent and that
visitation was in Maya’s best interests.32  The Maryland Court of Spe-
cial Appeals affirmed.33
In its reversal, the Maryland Court of Appeals reasoned that rec-
ognizing de facto parenthood would defy established Maryland case
law by allowing third parties in visitation and custody cases to “short-
circuit[ ] the requirement to show unfitness or exceptional circum-
stances.”34  Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Bell emphasized that
25. See Ulman v. Mayor of Balt., 72 Md. 587, 592, 20 A. 141, 142 (1890) (“The Article of
the Constitution is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial
powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave the Legislature free to
make any process due process of law by its mere will and pleasure.”).
26. See Woodell v. State, 2 Md. App. 433, 437, 234 A.2d 890, 892 (1967) (“[A]ll pre-
sumptions favor the constitutionality of a duly enacted statute and it will not be declared
unconstitutional unless it plainly contravenes the federal or state constitutions.”).
27. Janice M., 404 Md. at 685, 948 A.2d at 87; see also Emily R. Lipps, Note, Janice M. v.
Margaret K.: Eliminating Same-Sex Parents’ Rights to Raise Their Children by Eliminating the De
Facto Parent Doctrine, 68 MD. L. REV. 691 (2009).
28. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 171 Md. App. 528, 536–37, 540, 910 A.2d 1145, 1150–52
(2006), rev’d, 404 Md. 661, 948 A.2d 73 (explaining that the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County granted Margaret visitation because she was a de facto parent and visitation was in
Maya’s best interests and upholding that decision upon finding that the lower court
neither erred nor abused its discretion).
29. Janice M., 404 Md. at 666, 948 A.2d at 76.
30. Id. at 666–67, 948 A.2d at 76.
31. Id. at 667–68, 948 A.2d at 76–77.
32. Id. at 668, 948 A.2d at 77.
33. Janice M., 171 Md. App. at 538, 910 A.2d at 1151.
34. Janice M., 404 Md. at 685, 948 A.2d at 87.  In two prior cases, the court held that
third parties seeking custody or visitation must prove parental unfitness or exceptional
circumstances before a court could apply the best interests of the child test. See Koshko v.
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the United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that par-
ents have a constitutional right “to direct and govern the care, cus-
tody, and control of their children.”35  In addition, the Maryland
Declaration of Rights often affords an even more protective “compli-
ment of safeguards.”36  Thus, to adequately protect the full array of
these liberties, the Court of Appeals previously has required third par-
ties seeking custody or visitation of a child to show that the legal par-
ent is unfit or that such exceptional circumstances exist that the child
would suffer serious harm if the court denied the third party’s peti-
tion.37  With only one judge dissenting,38 the Court of Appeals refused
to treat de facto parents any differently than other third parties.39
The problem with the lower courts’ decisions in Janice M., the court
reasoned, was that both courts had granted Margaret visitation based
on her status as a de facto parent without first deciding whether ex-
ceptional circumstances existed.40  The court remanded the case to
the circuit court to determine that issue.41
In one of the more enigmatic parts of the opinion, the Court of
Appeals suggested that lawmakers might recognize de facto
parenthood by enacting third party visitation statutes.42  But, the court
gave little guidance as to the constitutional requirements that a statute
Haining, 398 Md. 404, 444–45, 921 A.2d 171, 195 (2007) (concluding that “a finding of
either parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances demonstrating the current or fu-
ture detriment to the child” is a “prerequisite to application of the best interests analysis”);
McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 325–26, 869 A.2d 751, 754 (2005) (holding that “in
disputed custody cases where private third parties are attempting to gain custody of chil-
dren from their natural parents,” a court must determine “that both natural parents are
unfit to have custody of their children or that extraordinary circumstances exist which are
significantly detrimental to the child” before conducting the “best interest of the child”
analysis).
35. Janice M., 404 Md. at 671, 948 A.2d at 79.
36. Id. at 679 n.7, 948 A.2d at 83 n.7 (quoting Koshko, 398 Md. at 443–44, 921 A.2d at
194) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. at 685, 948 A.2d at 87.
38. In dissent, Judge Raker argued that the court not only should recognize de facto
parenthood, but it also should focus solely on the child’s best interests in determining
whether a de facto parent should have custody or visitation rights. Id. at 696–97, 948 A.2d
at 94 (Raker, J., dissenting).
39. See id. at 685, 948 A.2d at 87 (majority opinion) (“Even were we to recognize some
form of de facto parenthood, the real question . . . will remain, whether, in a custody or
visitation dispute, a third party . . . who satisfies the test necessary to show de facto
parenthood should be treated differently from other third parties.”)
40. Id. at 695, 948 A.2d at 93.  The circuit court found no evidence that Janice was an
unfit parent. Id. at 667, 948 A.2d at 76.
41. Id. at 682, 695–96, 948 A.2d at 85, 93.
42. See id. at 686–89, 948 A.2d at 88–89 (discussing a Minnesota statute that grants de
facto parents visitation rights and concluding that the Maryland General Assembly has the
power to enact similar legislation if it so desires).
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granting de facto parents visitation rights would need to meet.  Noting
that other states had already enacted similar statutes, the court fo-
cused on a Minnesota law granting visitation to third parties who had
lived with a child for at least two years.43  The court further detailed
how the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
provision under strict scrutiny.44  Providing a lengthy excerpt of the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion, the Maryland Court of Appeals
pointed out the distinction between the Minnesota statute and a third
party visitation law that the United States Supreme Court struck down
in 2000.45  The Court of Appeals then noted that if the Maryland legis-
lature wished to enact similar legislation, it would be “within its pre-
rogative, of course.”46  But just as quickly, the court cautioned that it
“express[ed] no view . . . as to any such statute’s constitutionality”
under the federal and state constitutions.47
The lack of clarity in Janice M. provides little insight into how the
court might rule on a constitutional challenge to statutory de facto
parenthood.48  More telling are the court’s decisions in other areas of
family law and due process, which receive more attention in Part IV.
Equally important is the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court, which is the focus of the next Part.
III. LEGISLATION RECOGNIZING DE FACTO PARENTHOOD IS VALID
UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
As the Janice M. court noted,49 the United States Supreme Court
long has recognized the right of parents to raise their children as they
see fit.50  But, the precise scope of this right, and to whom it applies, is
less clear.  Though the Court has declared that the parental right of
43. Id. at 686–87, 686 n.10, 948 A.2d at 88 & n.10 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257C.08,
subdiv. 4 (West 2007)). The Minnesota statute also requires visitation to be in the child’s
best interests and that visitation “not interfere with the relationship between the custodial
parent and the child.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257C.08, subdiv. 4.
44. Janice M., 404 Md. at 687–89, 948 A.2d at 88–89.
45. Id.  The 2000 Supreme Court case referenced in the Janice M. opinion is Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Troxel involved a Washington statute that allowed any third
party to petition for visitation with a child.  530 U.S. at 60 (plurality opinion).  The Su-
preme Court found the statute “breathtakingly broad,” because it failed to limit the scope
of potential petitioners and “gave no special weight” to the legal parent’s decision making.
Id. at 67, 69.  For a more detailed discussion of Troxel, see infra Part III.A.2.
46. Janice M., 404 Md. at 689, 948 A.2d at 89.
47. Id.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 42–47. R
49. See text accompanying supra note 35. R
50. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (noting that parents’ interest “in the care, custody,
and control of their children” is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court”).
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child-rearing is a fundamental liberty,51 the Court’s decisions regard-
ing parental rights have applied something less than strict scrutiny.52
At the same time, the Court has recognized that nonparent family
members also have protectable interests.53  Finally, although the
Court has emphasized that parental rights stem from an individual’s
assumption of parental responsibilities, the Court has continually de-
ferred defining parenthood.54  In light of this framework, the Mary-
land lawmakers’ proposed legislation would have been valid under the
Federal Constitution.55
A. In Defining Parents’ Constitutional Rights, the Supreme Court Has
Emphasized Parents’ Responsibility to Assume Caregiver Roles, the
Competing Interests of Children and Other Family Members, and
States’ Broad Authority to Assign and Limit Parental Power
The Court’s parental rights cases offer many insights relevant to
the constitutionality of de facto parenthood.  The Court has estab-
lished constitutional protection for parents but allowed states to in-
fringe such rights when the state’s interest outweighs that of the
parents.56  In addition, the Court has recognized that parental rights
compete with the constitutional interests of children and other family
members.57  Finally, the Court has frequently deferred to state defini-
tions of parenthood while making clear that individuals who assume
caregiving roles have a greater claim to constitutional protections as
parents.58  Under this framework, Maryland lawmakers’ proposed leg-
islation to recognize de facto parenthood would have been constitu-
tionally valid.
1. Parents Have a Constitutional Right to Raise Their Children As
They See Fit
For decades, the Supreme Court has recognized that parents pos-
sess a special constitutional right to decide how to raise their children.
In the 1923 case Meyer v. Nebraska,59 the Court struck down a statute
barring foreign language instruction to children who had not yet
51. Id.
52. See infra Part III.A.2.
53. See infra Part III.A.3.
54. See infra Part III.A.4.
55. See infra Part III.A–B.
56. See infra Part III.A.1–2.
57. See infra Part III.A.3.
58. See infra Part III.A.4.
59. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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passed the eighth grade.60  In so doing, the Court emphasized that the
Due Process Clause61 protects “not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint” but also the right to contract, to pursue common occupations,
to acquire knowledge, and to “establish a home and bring up chil-
dren.”62  Though the Court’s opinion rested partly on the right of
individuals to teach foreign languages and the rights of children to
acquire knowledge,63 the Court found that the statute at issue materi-
ally interfered with “the power of parents to control the education of
their own.”64  Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,65 the Court
again invoked the rights of parents when it struck down an Oregon
statute that required all children to attend public schools.66  Accord-
ing to the Court, the statute “unreasonably interfere[d] with the lib-
erty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control.”67
In the following decades, the Court described parental rights in
increasingly reverential terms.  By 1944, the Court considered it “car-
dinal” that “the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents.”68  Thirty years later, the Court declared parents’ right
“to guide the religious future and education of their children” a “fun-
damental interest.”69  In 2000, the Court reaffirmed that the “interest
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by
this Court.”70
Despite this exalting language, however, the Court has been less
protective of parental rights than of other so-called fundamental liber-
ties.71  Typically, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to fundamental
rights, invalidating state infringement unless the state could show that
60. Id. at 397, 403.
61. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from de-
priving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XXIV, § 1.
62. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
63. See, e.g., id. at 400 (noting that parents have a duty to provide children “education
suitable to their station in life” and that teachers have a “right thus to teach”).
64. Id. at 401.
65. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
66. Id. at 534–35.
67. Id.
68. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
69. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
70. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
71. See infra Part III.A.2.  Among the rights the Court has deemed fundamental liber-
ties are the rights to free speech, free exercise of religion, travel, and voting. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 943 (3d ed. 2009).
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the action was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.72  For
example, in a case involving the fundamental right to marry, the
Court invalidated a law that required individuals who were under an
obligation to pay child support to seek court approval before ob-
taining a marriage license.73  Although the Court acknowledged that
the state had a substantial interest in assuring that children receive
the benefit of child support,74 it held that the state could accomplish
its end through means less restrictive of the right to marriage, such as
wage garnishment, civil contempt, or criminal penalties.75  Con-
versely, the Court has upheld state restrictions on parental rights with-
out requiring a showing that such restrictions are necessary to further
compelling state interests.76
2. Although the Supreme Court Has Deemed Parental Rights
Fundamental Liberties, Such Rights May Be Subject to State
Interference Even When the State Fails to Narrowly
Tailor Its Intrusion to a Compelling State Interest
In cases involving challenges to parental rights, the Court typi-
cally has employed a “sliding scale” inquiry into the rationality of gov-
ernment intrusion.77  As the degree of government interference has
increased, so too has the Court’s level of scrutiny.78  In Santosky v.
Kramer,79 for instance, the Court emphasized that parents facing an
order to terminate parental rights possess a “vital interest in prevent-
ing the irretrievable destruction of their family life”80 because the
state “seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest,
but to end it.”81  Accordingly, parents facing a termination order
“have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those
resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.”82  Similarly, in
M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,83 the Court emphasized the “unique kind of depriva-
72. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 943; David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Con- R
stitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 838 (1999).
73. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375, 388 (1978).
74. Id. at 388.
75. Id. at 388–90.
76. See infra Part III.A.2.
77. Meyer, supra note 72, at 838–41. R
78. Id.
79. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
80. Id. at 753.
81. Id. at 759.
82. Id. at 753.  The Court held that before a state may terminate someone’s parental
rights, the state must prove the necessity of doing so by “at least clear and convincing
evidence.” Id. at 769.
83. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
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tion” that comes with the termination of parental rights.84  Because
this sanction is “so severe and so irreversible,”85 the Court recognized
the need to apply heightened constitutional protection to an indigent
mother appealing a court order terminating her parental rights.86  In
so holding, the Court contrasted termination with less intrusive cus-
tody orders.87  If not explicitly so holding, the Court has at least im-
plied that the Constitution provides more protection when parents
suffer a complete loss of parental authority as opposed to only an in-
terference with that right.88
Even in those cases involving complete loss of parental rights,
however, the Court has refrained from employing strict scrutiny.
While noting the need for “close consideration”89 of the state’s au-
thority to sever the parent-child bond in M.L.B., the Court never dis-
cussed the state’s need to demonstrate a compelling interest or to
narrowly tailor its infringement of parental rights to that interest.90
Instead, the Court employed a simple balancing test, analyzing “the
character and intensity of the individual interest at stake, on the one
hand, and the State’s justification for its exaction, on the other.”91
The Court concluded that an indigent mother’s attempt to prevent
the “devastatingly adverse action” of losing her parental rights far out-
weighed the state’s financial interest in charging an administrative fee
for appeals.92  In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,93 the Court
noted that states have an “urgent interest” in children’s welfare,94 but
never once mentioned the word “compelling.”95 Lassiter involved an
indigent mother who argued that the fundamental nature of parental
rights entitled her to appointed counsel in a proceeding to terminate
84. Id. at 118 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
85. Id. (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759).
86. Id. at 113–24.  Specifically, the Court held that Mississippi could not deny appeals
of termination orders because of a parent’s inability to pay administrative fees. Id. at 107.
87. Id. at 118 (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
88. Meyer, supra note 72, at 840. R
89. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116–17.
90. The Court contended that Mississippi’s financial interest would satisfy a “rationality
requirement,” but not the more demanding standard for “quasi-criminal” proceedings,
such as those to terminate parental rights. Id. at 123–25.
91. Id. at 120–21.
92. Id. at 122, 125.
93. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
94. Id. at 27.
95. Justice Blackman’s dissent provides the only use of the word “compelling.” Id. at 58
(Blackman, J., dissenting).  As Justice Blackman pointed out, however, the Court empha-
sized the “compelling interest in the accuracy of [the] determination” of paternity in an-
other case decided the same day. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Little v. Streater, 452
U.S. 1, 13 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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those rights.96  Rather than applying strict scrutiny, however, the
Court weighed various elements against a presumption that an indi-
gent litigant has a right to counsel only where he risks losing personal
freedom.97  According to the Court, not even a mother’s “extremely
important” interest in maintaining a bond with her child would suffi-
ciently rebut that presumption in every case.98  Consequently, the
Court held that states may deny indigent parents counsel in proceed-
ings to terminate parental rights.99  Thus, even in cases threatening
complete loss of parental power, the Court has refrained from apply-
ing strict scrutiny, which is typically the standard used in cases involv-
ing fundamental interests.
When state action falls short of terminating parental rights, the
Court has allowed broad limitation of parental authority without con-
sidering whether such action is essential to furthering a strong state
interest.  In one of the earliest parental rights cases, Prince v. Massachu-
setts,100 the Court upheld an absolute ban on children selling pam-
phlets on the street, even when a parent or guardian was present.101
Although the case arose before the Court had developed its strict scru-
tiny standard, the case illustrates the broad deference the Court has
traditionally given states to regulate parental rights.  When a guardian
challenged the law in Prince as an overly broad “absolute prohibition,
not merely a reasonable regulation,” the Court countered that “the
state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and
authority in things affecting the child’s welfare.”102  Acting as parens
96. Id. at 24 (majority opinion).
97. Id. at 27.  Specifically, the Court considered three elements: the parental interests
at stake, the government’s interests, and “the risk that the procedures used will lead to
erroneous decisions.” Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
98. Id. at 31–32.  In addition to recognizing the state’s “urgent interest” in children’s
welfare, the Court noted the financial interest of the government “to avoid both the ex-
pense of appointed counsel and the cost of the lengthened proceedings his presence may
cause.” Id. at 27–28.  As to the question of accuracy in proceedings, the Court recognized
that “the ultimate issues with which a termination hearing deals are not always simple.” Id.
at 30.  Nonetheless, the Court reasoned that the “incapacity of the uncounseled parent . . .
would not always be[ ] great enough to make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
parent’s rights insupportably high.” Id. at 31.  Because the strength of the various interests
would vary from case to case, the Court refrained from requiring counsel in every proceed-
ing to terminate parental rights. Id.  Instead, the Court opted to “leave the decision . . . to
be answered in the first instance by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review.”
Id. at 31–32.
99. Id. at 31–33.
100. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
101. Id. at 169–70.
102. Id. at 167.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-2\MLR214.txt unknown Seq: 14 18-MAR-11 7:30
538 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:525
patriae,103 the state may restrict parents’ control over their children by
legislating compulsory school attendance or prohibiting child la-
bor.104  Conceding that the presence of a guardian or parent could
“lessen the likelihood” of harm to the child, the Court deferred to the
state legislature’s determination that an outright ban was “necessary to
accomplish its legitimate objectives.”105  Effectively, the Prince Court
applied what it now refers to as “loose” rational basis scrutiny—a stan-
dard far more lenient than strict scrutiny.
The Court’s most recent statement on parental rights reaffirms its
preference for informally balancing factors over applying strict scru-
tiny. Troxel v. Granville106 involved a couple who petitioned to have
overnight visits with their granddaughters under a Washington third
party visitation statute.107  The couple’s son, Brad Troxel, had two
children with Tommie Granville.108  After Troxel and Granville sepa-
rated, Brad Troxel lived with his parents and regularly hosted the girls
on weekend visits.109  Two years after the separation, Brad Troxel
committed suicide.110  Though the grandparents initially continued
regular visits with the children, Granville later limited the visits to
once a month.111  Disappointed with this arrangement, the Troxels
sued under a state statute that allowed any person to petition for visita-
tion rights at any time.112
In a case that produced six separate opinions, a plurality of the
Supreme Court bypassed strict scrutiny and held that the statute was
103. Latin for “ultimate parent or parent of the country,” parens patriae is a common law
doctrine under which the state serves “as the ultimate guardian of all children.”  Vivek S.
Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System’s Disregard for the Constitutional
Rights of Nonoffending Parents, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 60 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As early as 1890, the Supreme Court established that parens patriae was “inherent
in the supreme power of every State” for “the prevention of injury to those who cannot
protect themselves.”  Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).
104. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
105. Id. at 169–70.  The Court noted that even parentally supervised children could suf-
fer “emotional excitement and psychological or physical injury” while “propagandizing the
community.” Id.  Notably, however, the Court pointed to no legislative findings to support
this statement. Id. at 170 (noting only that “Massachusetts has determined that an absolute
prohibition . . . is necessary to accomplish its legitimate objectives”).
106. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
107. Id. at 60–61 (plurality opinion).
108. Id. at 60.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 60–61.
112. Id. at 61.
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unconstitutional as applied.113  Writing for the plurality, Justice
O’Connor found that parents have a “fundamental right” to make de-
cisions about the control and custody of their children; thus, any
court-ordered visitation necessarily interferes with that right.114
Rather than applying strict scrutiny and demanding that the state
show a narrowly tailored compelling interest in such broad visitation
standards, the plurality rested on narrower grounds.115  Justice
O’Connor concluded that Washington’s statute was “breathtakingly
broad”116 and unconstitutional as applied to Granville because the
trial judge had given no deference to the mother’s decision about
what was in her daughters’ best interests.117  Because courts presume
that fit parents act in their children’s best interests, the plurality ex-
plained, states may not impose their own child welfare decisions with-
out first rebutting this presumption with “special factors.”118  Despite
failing to explain what might constitute “special factors,” the Troxel
plurality found that the state did not satisfy its burden.119  The Court
did not address whether those petitioning for visitation must show ex-
ceptional circumstances or potential harm to the child.120  The Court
also said nothing of the need for states to show a compelling interest
before interfering with parental rights.121
On the rare occasions that the Court has applied strict scrutiny to
cases involving parental rights, the Court has found that other funda-
mental liberties bolstered the parents’ need for constitutional protec-
tion.  In Wisconsin v. Yoder,122 for instance, the Court applied strict
scrutiny to a compulsory school attendance law because it interfered
with the rights of Amish parents and children to freely exercise their
113. Id. at 67; see also David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and
Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1141–42 (2001) (noting that the Court did not apply strict
scrutiny in Troxel, which would have required the state to show that its regulation was nar-
rowly tailored to a compelling interest).
114. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66–67.
115. See id. at 67–73 (failing to apply strict scrutiny review to the Washington
nonparental visitation statute).
116. Id. at 67.
117. Id. at 69–70.
118. Id. at 68–69.
119. The Court suggested that even the death of a parent did not constitute such a
special factor. See id. (noting that “so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her
children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the
private realm of the family”).
120. Id. at 73.  The Troxel plurality explicitly evaded defining “the precise scope of the
parental due process right in the visitation context.” Id.
121. See supra text accompany note 115. R
122. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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religious beliefs.123  While the Court acknowledged that the statute
also burdened parental rights, it was the additional concern arising
from the First Amendment that convinced the Court that heightened
scrutiny was necessary.124  Since then, the Court has applied true strict
scrutiny in parental rights cases only when the state action at issue
impacted another fundamental liberty.
Despite the Court’s use of laudatory language, parental rights re-
ceive less protection under the Constitution than do other so-called
fundamental liberties.  Even in cases in which the Court has found
state intrusion on parental rights unconstitutional, it has done so with-
out invoking strict scrutiny.  Indeed, the only parental rights cases to
apply true strict scrutiny have involved other fundamental liberties.  In
the other parental rights cases, the Court’s reliance on balancing tests
suggests its awareness that parents’ rights often compete with the im-
portant interests of other private stakeholders, including other family
members.
3. While Establishing the Rights of Parents, the Supreme Court Has
Recognized That Children and Other Family Members Also
Have Protectable Interests
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to apply strict scrutiny to paren-
tal rights cases coincides with the acknowledgement that the Constitu-
tion also protects the interests of children.  Perhaps no line of cases
demonstrates this more clearly than the Court’s jurisprudence involv-
ing minors’ abortion rights.  In Bellotti v. Baird,125 for instance, the
Court began its analysis by stating that “neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”126  Noting that
states may ordinarily impose parental notice and consent require-
ments on a minor’s “right to make important decisions,”127 the Court
concluded that the “abortion decision differs in important ways.”128
Accordingly, the Court held that a pregnant minor need not notify
123. Id. at 215–34.
124. See id. at 233 (“[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exer-
cise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the
State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”); see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 881 & n.1 (1990) (noting that the Yoder Court applied strict scrutiny only because the
case involved both due process and free exercise interests), superseded by statute, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Gon-
zales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficante Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
125. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
126. Id. at 633 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)).
127. Id. at 640.
128. Id. at 642.
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her parents of her intent to seek an abortion.129  In so holding, the
Court balanced the interests of parents against those of their children,
concluding that a minor’s fundamental right to an abortion out-
weighed the constitutional right of parents to raise their children as
they see fit.130  Two years later, in H.L. v. Matheson,131 the Court up-
held a statute requiring a physician to give notice to a minor’s parents
before performing an abortion on their daughter.132  Notably, the
Court made clear that the statute’s constitutionality rested partly on
the fact that parents lacked “veto power over the minor’s abortion
decision.”133  Similarly, in Hodgson v. Minnesota,134 the Court balanced
the rights of minors against those of their parents in upholding a state
law that required parental notification of both parents before a minor
had an abortion.135  Critical to the Court’s conclusion was a statutory
provision that allowed minors to bypass parental notification by seek-
ing a court order allowing the abortion.136  In its cases involving mi-
nors and abortion, the Court has made clear that the Constitution
protects not only the liberty interests of parents but also those of their
children.
In several other cases, the Court has recognized that family mem-
bers who are not legal parents also have protectable interests in family
matters.  In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,137 for instance, the Court
recognized a grandmother’s interest in maintaining her family
unit.138  The Fourteenth Amendment protects not only parental
rights, the Court said, but a broader “freedom of personal choice in
matters of . . . family life.”139  The Court found that this freedom en-
compassed a grandmother’s right to live with her son and two grand-
129. Id. at 643.  Specifically, the Court held that a state can require a minor to seek
parental consent for an abortion only if it also provided the minor the alternative of seek-
ing a judicial order. Id.  “A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either:
(1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision,
in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2) that even if
she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her
best interests.” Id. at 643–44 (footnote omitted).
130. See id. at 647 (finding that a statute requiring parental consent, without the oppor-
tunity to go directly to a court to gain permission for an abortion, would pose “an undue
burden upon the exercise by minors of the right to seek an abortion”).
131. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
132. Id. at 399–400, 413.
133. Id. at 411.
134. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
135. Id. at 422–23.
136. Id. at 423, 455.
137. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
138. See id. at 495–96, 499 (striking down a city ordinance that barred a grandmother
from living with her grandson).
139. Id. at 499 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)).
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sons, and consequently, the Court struck down a zoning ordinance
that allowed only nuclear families to live together.140  Similarly, in
Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court explained that parental rights cases
more generally recognize “the private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter.”141  As a result, the Court entertained an aunt’s
challenge to a child labor law that prohibited children from selling
pamphlets on the street.142
Troxel provides another example of the Court’s acknowledgement
that nonparent family members have constitutionally protected paren-
tal interests.143  In considering the factors that combined to violate
Granville’s rights as a parent, the plurality emphasized that Granville
never sought to completely cut off visitation between her children and
their grandparents.144  The plurality then contrasted the statute to
those in other states that allowed court intervention only when a par-
ent has denied visitation, not merely curtailed it.145  Parental decisions
to cut off contact between children and certain third parties could
warrant closer judicial scrutiny only if the parties have their own inter-
ests worthy of protection.146  Recognition of these competing interests
may explain the Court’s reluctance to strike down the Washington
statute on its face.  Emphasizing that many state courts resolve family
law questions “on a case-by-case basis,” the plurality remained “hesi-
tant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the
Due Process Clause as a per se matter.”147
As the Court has established and defined the constitutional rights
of parents, it also has recognized that family relationships involve
other parties with their own constitutional interests.  In cases such as
Bellotti,148 the Court has acknowledged that the Constitution protects
children, even when their interests conflict with those of their parents.
As recently as Troxel, the Court has recognized that other parties, such
140. Id. at 495–99.
141. 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
142. See id. at 159–61, 170 (recognizing the legitimacy of the aunt’s claim of a parental
right, but finding that the state’s interest in protecting children outweighed that right).
Prince was the guardian of her nine-year-old niece, whom she allowed to join her in distrib-
uting religious literature in public. Id. at 159, 162.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 106–21. R
144. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 71 (2000).
145. Id. at 71–72.
146. See Meyer, supra note 113, at 1152 (noting the Troxel Court’s “seeming acknowl- R
edgement of the constitutional relevance of the ongoing changes in family relationships,”
including its recognition of “substantial emotional relationships between children and
non-parents”).
147. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 125–30. R
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as grandparents, may have protectable interests in family matters.
The Court’s ability to balance these competing interests, however,
hinges on its determination of who qualifies as a parent.
4. The Supreme Court Often Defers to State Determinations of
Parenthood, but Has Emphasized That Parental Rights
Correspond to Parental Obligations
In most of its parental rights jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
has affirmed the states’ ability to determine who is a parent.149  Cases
involving unwed fathers, for instance, have shown the Court’s willing-
ness to accept states’ assignment of parental liberties even when it
means denying rights to biological fathers.  For example, in Quilloin v.
Walcott,150 the Court upheld a Georgia law that deprived a biological
father the power to block an adoption.151  Under the law, an unmar-
ried father could veto an adoption only if he married the mother and
acknowledged the child as his own, or if he sought a court order de-
claring paternity.152  Otherwise, state courts applied the “best inter-
ests” standard to a father’s petition for custody, rather than
automatically granting custody absent a showing of the father’s paren-
tal unfitness.153  The law required that only the biological mother con-
sent to the adoption.154  Upholding the law, the Court concluded that
the state had a legitimate role in determining which relationships be-
tween an adult and a child would enjoy constitutional protections.155
Similarly, in Lehr v. Robertson,156 the Court upheld a New York law that
allowed the adoption of a child without prior notice to the biological
father.157  Under the law, notice was only required if a court had al-
149. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (“In the vast majority of cases,
state law determines the final outcome.”).
150. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
151. Id. at 248–49, 265, 267–68.
152. Id. at 248–49.
153. See id. at 249–51 (describing how a Georgia trial court applied the “best interests”
standard to grant an adoption over the objections of the biological father).
154. Id. at 248.
155. See id. at 256 (“We think appellant’s interests are readily distinguishable from those
of a separated or divorced father, and accordingly believe that the State could permissibly
give appellant less veto authority than it provides to a married father.”).  The Court’s rul-
ing necessarily rejected the biological father’s claim of paternity.  He never sought an or-
der claiming paternity until the husband of the child’s mother petitioned for adoption; by
this time, the husband had lived with the mother and child for eleven years. Id. at 247,
249.  The state courts rejected the biological father’s petition, noting that adoption was in
the child’s best interests. Id. at 251.  The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at
254.
156. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
157. Id. at 249–51.
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ready recognized the biological father as the father, he had demon-
strated an interest in the child by filing a claim of possible paternity
with the state’s putative father registry, he was listed on the child’s
birth certificate as the father, he lived openly with the child and the
child’s mother and represented himself as the father, he married the
child’s mother before the child was six months old, or he was identi-
fied as the father by the mother in a sworn statement.158  The biologi-
cal father in Lehr appealed the adoption of his child on several
grounds: first, the law failed to adequately protect a putative father’s
actual or potential relationship with his child because it failed to give
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before depriving the
father of that relationship; second, the law violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by according putative fathers fewer procedural rights than
biological mothers; and finally, even if the law adequately protected a
putative father’s interest, he had adequately expressed an interest in
his child by filing an affiliation proceeding in another court.159  The
Supreme Court rejected each argument.160  Despite conceding that
the Justices may not have adopted the same statutory scheme, the
Court concluded that a state has the authority to define parental
rights for the purpose of encouraging adoption and protecting the
privacy interests of unwed mothers.161
Just a few years later, the Court again affirmed a state’s power to
define who counts as a legal parent.  In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,162 the
Court upheld a California law that assigned paternity to the man mar-
ried to a child’s mother even though he was not the child’s biological
father.163  A biological father could rebut the so-called “marital pre-
sumption” only if the mother or the husband sought blood tests
within two years of the child’s birth.164  Writing for a plurality, Justice
Scalia concluded that it was “a question of legislative policy and not
constitutional law” whether a state will allow a biological father to re-
but the presumption that a woman’s husband is the father of her
child.165  Thus, the Court reiterated states’ broad power to determine
who qualifies as a legal parent.
158. Id. at 250–51.
159. Id. at 255, 264–65.  Though the biological father had failed to add his name to the
putative father registry, he filed a visitation and paternity petition a month after the adop-
tion proceeding began. Id. at 252.
160. See id. at 250 (rejecting both the due process and the equal protection arguments).
161. See id. at 264–68.
162. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
163. Id. at 115, 129–30.
164. Id. at 115.
165. Id. at 129–30.
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Furthermore, the Court has afforded states substantial discretion
in distributing various rights among parents.  In Elk Grove Unified
School District v. Newdow,166 the Court found that a father lacked stand-
ing to challenge the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance at his
daughter’s school because he was a noncustodial parent; state law had
restricted decision making authority to the girl’s mother.167  Strik-
ingly, the Court did not question the power of state lawmakers to de-
termine who could assert constitutional parental rights.168  While
California law provided Newdow a “cognizable right to influence his
daughter’s religious upbringing,”169 the law defined Newdow as a non-
custodial parent, and thus someone who lacked “a right to dictate to
others what they may and may not say to his child respecting relig-
ion.”170  State law assigned this latter authority to the girl’s mother.171
Therefore, in Quilloin, Michael H., and Elk Grove, the Court has estab-
lished that states have broad authority to define parenthood and dis-
tribute parental rights.
Despite its frequent deference to the states, the Court has pro-
vided some guidance regarding what entitles someone to claim paren-
tal rights.  In particular, the Court has emphasized the link between
parental rights and parental responsibilities.  Thus, individuals who
have failed to take on caregiving roles may sacrifice their claims to
constitutional protections as parents.  In Quilloin,172 for instance, the
Court rejected the constitutional claim of a biological father after not-
ing that he “has never shouldered any significant responsibility with
respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the
child.”173  The Court made this point more explicit in Lehr v. Robert-
son.174  There, the Court noted that “[p]arental rights do not spring
full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child.
They require relationships more enduring.”175  Hence, the Court ex-
plained, if a natural father failed to “grasp[ ] that opportunity” to “de-
166. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
167. Id. at 4–5, 9, 16–18.
168. See id. at 16 (noting that Newdow’s parental status was defined by California domes-
tic relations law and that the Court typically deferred to lower courts’ interpretation of
state laws).
169. Id. at 16.
170. Id. at 9, 17.
171. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. R
172. See supra text accompanying notes 150–55. R
173. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 156–61. R
175. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1983) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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velop a relationship with his offspring” and “accept[ ] some measure
of responsibility for the child’s future,” the Constitution does not au-
tomatically afford him protection against state action.176
On the other hand, if a biological father has taken a more active
role in his child’s life, the Court has been more protective of his con-
stitutional rights as a parent.  In Caban v. Mohammed,177 for instance,
the Court struck down a state law that denied unwed fathers the
power to block the adoption of their children, even when their paren-
tal relationships were “substantial.”178  According to the Court, the
statute wrongly assumed that mothers inherently have stronger paren-
tal bonds with their children than did unwed fathers.179  The Court
acknowledged that states may encourage adoptions by drafting legisla-
tion that gives greater protections to a biological mother than to an
unwed father who has been absent from his child’s life.180  But, the
Court emphasized that when a father has established a “substantial
relationship with the child,” the state cannot justify a law that rejects
the father’s right to object to an adoption.181  Similarly, in Stanley v.
Illinois,182 the Court held that a state could not deny an unwed father
parental rights without first giving the father an opportunity to estab-
lish his parental fitness.183  Although it conceded that many unwed
fathers may be “unsuitable and neglectful parents,” the Court made
clear that “all unmarried fathers are not in this category.”184  Accord-
ingly, the Court has distinguished absentee fathers from those who
have been actively involved in their children’s lives.  Because the bio-
logical father in Lehr “never had any significant custodial, personal, or
financial relationship” with his child, the Court rejected his assertion
that the state was required to notify him before permitting another
man to adopt his child.185
The Court long has linked the constitutional rights of parents to
their obligations as children’s caretakers.  In Meyer v. Nebraska,186 the
Court noted that parents’ right of control over their children corre-
176. Id. at 262.
177. 441 U.S. 380 (majority opinion).
178. Id. at 382, 385–87.
179. Id. at 389.
180. See id. at 392 (“In those cases where the father never has come forward to partici-
pate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the State
from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child.”).
181. Id. at 393.
182. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
183. Id. at 649.
184. Id. at 654.
185. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262, 265 (1983).
186. See text accompanying supra notes 59–64. R
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sponds to “the natural duty of the parent to give his children educa-
tion suitable to their station in life.”187  Just two years later, in Pierce,188
the Court described a parent’s constitutional interest as a “right, cou-
pled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [the child] for addi-
tional obligations.”189  The Court reiterated this connection between
parental obligation and parental right when it declared in Prince190
that parents retained the right to dictate the “custody, care and nur-
ture of the child” but also were responsible for fulfilling the “primary
function” of preparing the child “for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder.”191  A survey of the Court’s parental rights cases
thus reveals that individuals who assume caregiving functions have
stronger claims to the constitutional protections of parenthood.
While denying parental rights to those who have neglected
caregiving functions, the Court has ratified states’ authority to define
parenthood in ways that maintain existing familial relationships.  In
Quilloin,192 for example, the Court noted that allowing adoption over
the biological father’s objections gave “full recognition to a family
unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except
[the biological father].”193 Michael H.194 provides another example of
the Court’s recognition that states may legislate with the purpose of
maintaining family units.  Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia
noted that when a child is the product of an extramarital affair, “the
natural father’s unique opportunity” to establish a meaningful rela-
tionship with his child “conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity
of the husband of the marriage.”195  Justice Scalia thus framed the
case as one of sparring interests, with the natural father’s “freedom” to
parent his biological child on the one hand, and the husband’s right
“to preserve the integrity of the traditional family unit” on the other
hand.196  The Court decided that a state may constitutionally “give cat-
egorical preference to the latter.”197  Hence, in both Quilloin and
Michael H., the Court recognized a state’s prerogative in favoring one
187. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
188. See text accompanying supra notes 65–67. R
189. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 100–05. R
191. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 150–55, 172–73. R
193. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 162–65. R
195. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128–29 (1989).
196. Id. at 130.
197. Id. at 129.
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definition of family over another.198  Both cases show that the states
have substantial authority to assign parental rights in ways that main-
tain existing family structures.
B. The Proposed Legislation Would Have Been Valid Under the Federal
Constitution
Maryland lawmakers’ proposed legislation to recognize de facto
parenthood likely would have survived a challenge under the Federal
Constitution.  The proposed legislation advanced strong state interests
of child welfare and preserving family units, and its recognition of de
facto parenthood sufficiently related to those interests.199  The pro-
posed legislation safeguarded rights of parents and the interests of
children and other family members,200 and it linked parental rights to
parental obligations.201
1. Recognizing De Facto Parenthood Sufficiently Relates to Achieving
Two Strong State Interests
The language of the proposed legislation made clear that
lawmakers intended for de facto parenthood to promote the general
welfare of children.  Only those adults who had established a “parent-
like,” “bonded and dependent relationship” with a child would have
qualified as de facto parents.202  In phrasing the requirement this way,
lawmakers hinted at the emotional and psychological harm that a
child may suffer when he loses contact with a parental figure.203  This
type of legislation, which aims to “guard the general interest in
youth’s well being,”204 falls within a state power the Supreme Court
long has recognized.  Because children cannot protect themselves, the
198. See Buss, supra note 12, at 658 (noting that “the Court has tolerated considerable R
state intrusions . . . aimed at facilitating, rather than disrupting, the functioning of a pri-
vate familial unit”).
199. See infra Part III.B.1.
200. See infra Part III.B.2.
201. See infra Part III.B.3.
202. H.B. 1241(B)(2)(I), (III), 427th Sess. (Md. 2010); S.B. 600(B)(2)(I), (III), 427th
Sess. (Md. 2010) (emphasis added).
203. Many commentators have addressed the importance of stability in a child’s per-
sonal relationships. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Sta-
tus: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L.
REV. 879, 902 (1984) (noting the “[n]ear consensus . . . that a child’s healthy growth de-
pends in large part upon the continuity of his personal relationships”); Patricia M. Logue,
The Rights of Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 95,
119 (2002) (arguing that states may constitutionally consider, “in the child’s behalf, intrud-
ing upon parental autonomy via court proceedings . . . to avoid an emotional or other
detriment to a child”).
204. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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state has a strong interest as parens patriae in protecting children’s
emotional well-being by recognizing de facto parenthood.205
The drafters of the proposed legislation sought to achieve a sec-
ond state interest that the Supreme Court has already validated: main-
taining existing parent-child relationships.  Though the bills’ sponsors
included only a vague purpose statement,206 the bills’ provisions made
clear that the lawmakers’ concern laid with preserving significant rela-
tionships between children and their caregivers.  To that end, de facto
parenthood status would have been available only to those individuals
who had “acted in a parent-like role” long enough to have established
“a bonded and dependent relationship with the minor child.”207
Moreover, an individual would not have become a de facto parent
without showing that the child’s legal parent “fostered the establish-
ment of a parent-like relationship between the minor child and the
individual.”208
De facto parenthood protects existing family units as much as
state actions the Court affirmed in its unwed father cases.  In Quilloin,
the Supreme Court specifically noted the state’s prerogative in as-
signing parental rights to preserve a “family unit already in exis-
tence.”209  Similarly, the Michael H. Court made clear that states may
adopt a presumption that the husband of a child’s biological mother
is the child’s father.210  The Supreme Court noted that such a pre-
sumption protects the important relationship between the child and
the man who has cared for and accepted the child as his own.211  Simi-
larly, recognizing de facto parents preserves bonds between children
and adults who have cared for them as parents.  In Janice M., had the
state recognized Margaret as a de facto parent, she would have been
able to maintain her relationship with Maya, the child she fed, bathed,
and otherwise nurtured for five years.212  The failure of the Maryland
Court of Appeals to recognize Margaret as a de facto parent severed
the bond between a child and a nonbiological caregiver that the Su-
preme Court exalted in Quilloin and Michael H.213  Thus, in proposing
205. See supra note 103 (describing the state’s interest as parens patriae). R
206. The purpose clause of each bill states only that the legislation would require “a
court to determine that an individual is a de facto parent under certain circumstances.”
H.B. 1241; S.B. 600.
207. H.B. 1241(B)(2)(III); S.B. 600(B)(2)(III).
208. H.B. 1241(B)(2)(I); S.B. 600(B)(2)(I).
209. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
210. See text accompanying supra notes 195–97. R
211. See text accompanying supra notes 195–97. R
212. See text accompanying supra note 3. R
213. The Court of Appeals rejected Margaret K.’s claim of parental rights, even though
she shared “responsibilities for preparing Maya’s food, changing her diapers, bathing her,
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to statutorily recognize de facto parenthood, Maryland lawmakers
sought to protect a state interest in maintaining familial relationships
that the Supreme Court has already endorsed as legitimate.
Recognizing de facto parenthood also relates sufficiently to these
interests that have survived constitutional challenge.  As the Supreme
Court noted in Prince, states have broad powers to limit parental free-
dom in “things affecting the child’s welfare.”214  Because the Supreme
Court’s emphasis on maintaining familial relationships implies that
severing such bonds would harm the child, Maryland lawmakers pro-
posed legislation that related directly to children’s welfare.215  Were
the Supreme Court to employ the sort of balancing test it has used in
earlier cases, the proposed legislation would have survived constitu-
tional attack.  The worst consequence de facto parenthood poses to a
legal parent is that it may render him unable to prevent another
caregiver from maintaining a significant bond with the child.216  This
pales in comparison to the kind of state intrusion that terminates pa-
rental rights217 or denies a parent the right to direct his child’s educa-
tion.218  Moreover, recognition of de facto parenthood neither
invalidates the rights of legal parents nor changes their legal status.219
Accordingly, the Supreme Court likely would have found that the
state’s interest in maintaining familial relationships and protecting
children from the harm of severing familial bonds outweighed a par-
ent’s interest in keeping a child from interacting with a de facto
parent.
In addition, the proposed legislation complied with the princi-
ples of Troxel.220  In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with
the “breathtakingly broad” scope of Washington’s third party visita-
tion statute.221  The statute stated that “[a]ny person” could petition
“at any time” to visit a child against the wishes of the legal parent.222
handling her schooling, addressing her healthcare needs, and performing most other care-
taking duties.” Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 666, 948 A.2d 73, 76 (2008).  These
are the same types of responsibilities that the Supreme Court has said correspond to paren-
tal rights. See text accompanying supra notes 156–65. R
214. See text accompanying supra note 102. R
215. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944); see text accompanying supra note
17. R
216. The proposed legislation would have granted de facto parents “the duties and obli-
gations of a parent” but would not have otherwise limited the rights of existing legal par-
ents.  H.B. 1241(C), 427th Sess. (Md. 2010); S.B. 600(C), 427th Sess. (Md. 2010).
217. See text accompanying supra notes 83–99. R
218. See text accompanying supra notes 65–67. R
219. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. R
220. See text accompanying supra notes 106–21. R
221. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000) (plurality opinion).
222. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Notably, however, the Troxel Court refrained from striking down all
third party visitation statutes or establishing a rule that third parties
must demonstrate parental unfitness or potential harm to succeed on
a petition for visitation.223  Reflecting on the changing demographics
of American families,224 the Troxel plurality recognized that most fam-
ily law matters are resolved on a case-by-case basis.225  Accordingly, the
Supreme Court invalidated the statute’s application on narrow
grounds, providing states only general guidelines on constitutionality:
(1) states must presume that a fit parent acts in her child’s best inter-
est and thus give special weight to the parent’s decisions;226 and (2)
states must demonstrate “special factors” in overcoming this
presumption.227
The proposed Maryland legislation complied with both of these
guidelines.  First, recognizing the presumption that fit parents act in
their child’s best interests, the proposed de facto parenthood legisla-
tion gave special weight to legal parents’ decisions.  Notably, de facto
parenthood status would have been available only to those individuals
who had the consent of the legal parent to interact with the child.228
Consent, however, would not have been enough.  The individual seek-
ing de facto parenthood status also would have had to show that the
legal parent “supported and fostered” a parent-like relationship be-
tween the individual and the child.229  Hence, the legal parent would
have wielded considerable power in determining who may achieve de
facto parenthood status.  According to one commentator, predomi-
nant in any successful petition for de facto parent status is a showing
that the legal parent at one time considered a relationship between
the petitioner and the child to be in the child’s best interests:
A showing that an involved parent exercised her autonomy
to permit or encourage the child to form an exceptionally
strong bond with another adult, affirming its importance to
the child’s best interests, gives the state cause to treat more
223. See id. at 73–75 (declining to rule more broadly on third party visitation statutes
and resting the decision on the “sweeping breadth” of the statute at hand).
224. Id. at 63–64.  In particular, the Court noted that twenty-eight percent of all chil-
dren under the age of eighteen lived in a single-parent family in 1996. Id. at 64.  In 1998,
5.6% of all children under the age of eighteen lived with their grandparents. Id.
225. Id. at 73.
226. Id. at 67–69.
227. Id. at 68.
228. H.B. 1241(B)(2)(I), 427th Sess. (Md. 2010); S.B. 600(B)(2)(I), 427th Sess. (Md.
2010).
229. Id.
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skeptically the parent’s claim that ending the relationship is
now what serves the child’s welfare.230
In this way, the proposed legislation incorporated the Troxel require-
ment that states give special weight to legal parents’ authority.
The proposed legislation also incorporated several “special fac-
tors” that could have been used to rebut any presumption that a legal
parent’s denial of visitation was in the child’s best interest.  The Troxel
Court did not explicitly define what constitutes a “special factor,” but
the plurality provided hints.231  For instance, the Court emphasized
timing, complaining that the Washington statute allowed someone to
petition for visitation at any time.232  Generally, the Court noted, a
state has no reason “to inject itself into the private realm of the fam-
ily.”233  In contrast to the Washington statute, the proposed Maryland
legislation would have allowed someone to petition for de facto
parenthood status only after enough time had passed that the individ-
ual established a “bonded and dependent relationship” with the child
that was “parental in nature.”234  The Troxel Court also was concerned
that a limitless number of people could petition for visitation under
the Washington statute,235 a factor that the Maryland lawmakers ad-
dressed by limiting who could qualify as de facto parents.  Only those
individuals who had the consent and support of the legal parents to
develop a parental relationship with the child could become de facto
parents.236  Finally, the proposed legislation would have required a pe-
titioner to establish the relevant evidence by a “clear and convincing”
margin.237  This provided yet another “special factor”—an extra layer
of protection for parental autonomy.  Only those cases that showed
“clear and convincing” evidence of a deep, emotional bond with the
child, fostered by the legal parent herself, would succeed under the
proposed legislation.238  Cases in which the de facto parent’s evidence
conflicted with the legal parent’s would not have met the standard
necessary to recognize de facto parenthood.239
230. Logue, supra note 203, at 120. R
231. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68; see also Meyer, supra note 113, at 1142 (noting that the “plu- R
rality refused to say just what ‘special factors’ might overcome the ‘presumption that fit
parents act in the best interests of their children’” (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72)).
232. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
233. Id. at 68.
234. H.B. 1241(B)(2)(III), 427th Sess. (Md. 2010); S.B. 600(B)(2)(III), 427th Sess. (Md.
2010).
235. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
236. H.B. 1241(B)(2)(I); S.B. 600(B)(2)(I).
237. H.B. 1241(B)(2); S.B. 600(B)(2).
238. See supra text accompanying note 235. R
239. See supra text accompanying note 238. R
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In proposing to recognize de facto parenthood, Maryland
lawmakers asserted strong state interests that the United States Su-
preme Court previously validated.  In numerous cases, the Supreme
Court has affirmed states’ substantial interests in child welfare240 and
preserving family units.241  Moreover, the proposed legislation would
have sufficiently related to that interest.  By redressing the concerns of
the Troxel Court, lawmakers bolstered their chances of surviving a con-
stitutional challenge to the law.
2. Recognizing De Facto Parenthood Acknowledges the Constitutional
Interests of Children and Other Family Members
While Maryland lawmakers protected parents’ rights by incorpo-
rating the Troxel principles in the proposed legislation, they also safe-
guarded the interests of nonlegal parents who serve as caregivers. In
Moore, the Court made clear that parents are not the only parties who
merit constitutional protection in family matters.242  Just as the rela-
tionship between children and their caregiving grandmother may be
substantial enough to warrant constitutional protection,243 de facto
parenthood recognizes that individuals such as same-sex partners,
stepparents, and unmarried partners have constitutional interests in
continuing relationships with the children they have nurtured.244  Ad-
mittedly, a de facto parent differs from the grandmother in Moore be-
cause a de facto parent’s claim to visitation or custody clashes with the
legal parent’s wishes.245  Further, unlike a grandparent, a de facto par-
ent is not merely a third party challenger.246  The proposed de facto
parenthood bill recognized the constitutional interests of individuals
like Margaret K. by granting them equal standing with legal parents in
240. See supra text accompanying notes 102–04. R
241. See supra text accompanying notes 190–98. R
242. See supra text accompanying notes 137–40. R
243. See supra text accompanying notes 137–40; see also Meyer, supra note 113, at 1175 & R
n.259 (noting that Moore defined constitutional protection of family privacy to encompass a
grandmother’s right to live with the grandchildren with whom she had been residing).
244. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999) (recognizing visitation
rights of a de facto parent, a person “who has no biological relation to the child, but has
participated in the child’s life as a member of the child’s family”).
245. Compare Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495–97 (1997) (describing a
grandmother’s constitutional challenge to a city ordinance that allowed only certain family
members to cohabitate), with Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 664, 948 A.2d 73, 75
(2008) (addressing a custody and visitation dispute between a legal parent and her long-
term same-sex partner).
246. The proposed Maryland legislation, for instance, would have granted de facto par-
ents “the duties and obligations of a parent.”  H.B. 1241(C), 427th Sess. (Md. 2010); S.B.
600(C), 427th Sess. (Md. 2010).
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disputes over custody or visitation.247  In so doing, however,
lawmakers gave the requisite “special weight” to legal parents’ deci-
sion making: Only those individuals who developed parent-child rela-
tionships with the consent and support of the children’s legal parents
could have become de facto parents.248  In this way, the proposed leg-
islation not only protected the authority of legal parents, but also rec-
ognized that other adults in a child’s life may have protectable
constitutional interests.
De facto parenthood also protects the interests of children, who
may suffer if they are unable to continue significant relationships with
nonlegal-parent caregivers.  As the Supreme Court has emphasized,
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to children as well as adults.249
The proposed Maryland legislation recognized this fact by increasing
the likelihood that children would not suffer the emotional and psy-
chological harm of losing contact with a significant caregiver.250
Drawing on the state’s power as parens patriae, lawmakers proposed de
facto parenthood as a means of protecting what the Supreme Court
has long acknowledged: “the interest of youth itself, and of the whole
community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given
opportunities for growth . . . .”251  Hence, the proposed de facto
parenthood legislation would have protected parents’ rights while rec-
ognizing the constitutional interests of children and their nonlegal
parent.
3. Recognizing De Facto Parenthood Effectively Links Parental Rights
to Parental Obligations
In proposing recognition of de facto parenthood, Maryland
lawmakers adopted the same reasoning of the Quilloin and Lehr
Courts.  If a natural parent loses parental rights for failing to establish
a significant relationship with his child,252 it follows that a parental
figure’s claim to constitutional protection of parental rights increases
as that individual assumes increasingly significant caregiving func-
247. Id.  In custody disputes between parents, Maryland courts apply the best interests of
the child standard.  McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 354–55, 869 A.2d 751, 771
(2005).  Thus, de facto parents presumably would not have to show that the legal parent is
unfit or that the child would suffer harm absent visitation, factors that third parties must
show in custody and visitation disputes. See supra note 34. R
248. See supra text accompanying notes 228–30. R
249. See supra text accompanying notes 125–26. R
250. See supra text accompanying notes 202–09. R
251. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 172–76. R
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tions.253  Thus, de facto parenthood employs the same reasoning vali-
dated by the Supreme Court in its unwed father cases.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in the unwed father cases sup-
ports whatever limit the proposed legislation would have placed on
the rights of legal parents.  Unlike adoption,254 the recognition of de
facto parents in the proposed legislation would not have terminated
the rights of natural parents.255  But, the addition of an individual
with rights to visit or to have custody of the child may well have di-
luted the authority of the legal parent.256  This dilution would have
been permissible, however, because of the Supreme Court’s conclu-
sion that the actions of parental figures affect the strength of their
constitutional claims.257  Under the bills, de facto parents could not
have existed without the consent and support of the legal parents.258
Thus, the proposed legislation appropriately applied the Supreme
Court’s principle that a parent’s actions affect the extent of his claims
to parental rights.
Maryland lawmakers’ proposal to recognize de facto parenthood
likely would have survived a challenge under the Federal Constitution.
The legislative proposal not only advanced strong state interests of
child welfare and maintaining family units, but its recognition of de
facto parenthood sufficiently related to those interests.259  The bills
safeguarded the rights of parents by redressing the concerns of the
Troxel Court while also protecting the interests of children and other
family members.260  Finally, the legislation effectively linked parental
rights to parental obligations according to the Court’s reasoning in
cases such as Quilloin and Lehr.261
253. See supra text accompanying notes 177–85. R
254. In adoption, “the new family unit” takes the place of the child’s birth parents,
rather than becoming an additional set of parents.  Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption,
Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150,
153 (1999).
255. While de facto parents would have had the “duties and obligations of a parent,”
nothing in the proposed Maryland legislation would have terminated the legal parents’
rights.  H.B. 1241(C), 427th Sess. (Md. 2010); Md. S.B. 600(C), 427th Sess. (Md. 2010).
256. A legal parent in a custody or visitation dispute with a de facto parent would no
longer enjoy a presumption that her decisions are in the best interests of her child. See
supra note 247.  Thus, any decision of a legal parent could be challenged by a de facto R
parent on the grounds that the decision was not in the best interests of the child.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 252–53. R
258. See supra text accompanying note 17. R
259. See supra Part III.B.1.
260. See supra Part III.B.2.
261. See supra Part III.B.3.
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IV. IF THEY PLAN TO REINTRODUCE THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION,
LAWMAKERS SHOULD AMEND IT SO THE PROPOSED
LEGISLATION WOULD SURVIVE A CHALLENGE UNDER
THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTION
The constitutional analysis of the proposed legislation does not
end with the Federal Constitution.  As Justice Brennan noted, “State
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections
often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of federal law.”262  Indeed, even when a Maryland constitu-
tional provision seems synonymous with a federal provision, the
Maryland Court of Appeals has emphasized that the similarity “does
not mean that the provision will always be interpreted or applied in
the same manner as its federal counterpart.”263
In Janice M., the Court of Appeals deliberately dodged the ques-
tion of whether de facto parenthood legislation would be constitu-
tional under state law.  While suggesting that the legislature might
enact a statute recognizing de facto parenthood, the court also with-
held judgment on whether such a statute could survive a constitu-
tional challenge.264  Muddying the water even further, the court
reiterated that although Article 24 has “long been equated” with the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the United States,265 the Court of Appeals has sometimes
found the Maryland provision to be more protective than its federal
counterpart.266  As explanation for these distinctions, however, the
Court of Appeals in Janice M. offered only the vague language of an
earlier case: “fundamental fairness demanded that we do so.”267
Despite its ambiguity in Janice M., the court’s jurisprudence more
generally suggests that the de facto parenthood legislation would have
survived constitutional scrutiny if lawmakers had made minor amend-
ments.  Although the Court of Appeals has found Article 24 to be
262. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
263. Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 370 Md. 604, 621, 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002).
264. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 686–89, 948 A.2d 73, 88–89 (2008).
265. Aero Motors, Inc. v. Adm’r, Motor Vehicle Admin., 274 Md. 567, 587, 337 A.2d 685,
699 (1975).
266. Id. at 679 n.7, 948 A.2d at 83 n.7. Article 24 states that “no man ought to be . . .
deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of
the land.” MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 24; see also infra Part IV.A.
267. Janice M., 404 Md. at 680 n.7, 948 A.2d at 84 n.7 (quoting Borchardt v. State, 367
Md. 91, 175, 786 A.2d 631, 681 (2001) (Raker, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  The court also cited a few examples of occasions when it has “read Maryland’s
due process clause more broadly than the federal constitution,” all of which related to
criminal procedure. Id.; see also infra Part IV.A.1–2.
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more protective than the Fourteenth Amendment most often in cases
involving economic liberties and the rights of criminal defendants,268
the court recently found that the Maryland due process provision of-
fered heightened protection in two family law cases.269  Adding detail
to the legislation would clarify what rights de facto parents can
claim.270  For the sake of caution, therefore, lawmakers should amend
the proposed legislation before reintroducing it.271
A. The Maryland Court of Appeals Interprets Article 24 to be More
Protective than the Fourteenth Amendment Only in
Certain Cases
1. Until Recently, the Court of Appeals Has Found Heightened State
Constitutional Protections Primarily in Cases Involving
Economic Liberties and the Rights of Criminal
Defendants
In Janice M., the only cases cited as examples of Article 24’s
heightened protection were criminal cases.272  Indeed, over the past
thirty years, the Court of Appeals has found on several occasions that
Article 24 provides criminal defendants more protection than the Fed-
eral Constitution.  In White v. State,273 for instance, the Court of Ap-
peals found that Maryland common law principles required the court
to merge two offenses, even though the Federal Constitution would
not require merger.274  Likewise, in Wadlow v. State,275 the court held
that when legislatures recommend prison sentences in certain circum-
stances, juries must find that such circumstances exist beyond a rea-
sonable doubt before recommending the corresponding sentence;276
federal law, however, requires only a finding by a preponderance of
268. See infra Part IV.A.1.
269. See infra Part IV.A.2.
270. See infra Part IV.B.
271. See infra Part IV.B.
272. See Janice M., 404 Md. at 679–80 & n.7, 948 A.2d at 83–84 & n.7 (citing only crimi-
nal cases as examples of the heightened protection offered by Article 24).
273. 318 Md. 740, 569 A.2d 1271 (1990), superseded by statute, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 3-601 (LexisNexis 2006), as recognized in Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 786 A.2d 706
(2001).
274. See id. at 744–45, 748, 569 A.2d at 1273–75 (noting that the rule of lenity provides
one basis for merger but pointing out that the Supreme Court has found the rule inappli-
cable in some cases where statutory language or legislative history shows lawmakers’ intent
not to merge offenses).
275. 335 Md. 122, 642 A.2d 213 (1994).
276. See id. at 132, 642 A.2d at 218 (“[W]hen the State seeks the enhanced penalties
provided by [the statute] it must allege the necessary fact concerning the amount, and
prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
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the evidence.277  In explaining why these criminal cases departed
from federal law, the Janice M. court mentioned only “fundamental
fairness.”278
Economic regulation is another area in which the Court of Ap-
peals has found more protection in Article 24 than in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.  More than
thirty years after the Supreme Court abandoned such a view,279 the
Court of Appeals continued to interpret substantive due process to
include the freedom to contract.280  While the Supreme Court re-
quired only a loose rational basis for economic regulations, the Court
of Appeals persisted in requiring that such regulations “bear a real
and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.”281  Even-
tually, Maryland courts also came to require only a rational basis for
economic regulations.282
The court, however, has had less opportunity to explore the
boundaries of Article 24’s protection of privacy and personal auton-
omy.283  As of 1989, the court had “not identified any right of privacy
protected by the Maryland Constitution.”284  This changed with two
recent child custody disputes that applied heightened state protec-
tions to legal parents.285  Even so, these cases shed little light on de
facto parenthood, as their facts differ substantially from any potential
dispute involving a statutorily recognized de facto parent.
277. Id. at 128, 642 A.2d at 216 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91
(1986)).
278. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 680 n.7, 948 A.2d 73, 84 n.7 (citing
Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 175, 786 A.2d 631, 681 (2001) (Raker, J., dissenting)).
279. In Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court found freedom of contract among those
rights protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  198 U.S.
45, 53 (1905).  For the next three decades, the Court applied heightened scrutiny and
permitted government interference with this freedom only to protect public health, safety,
or morals. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 602, 606.  What came to be known as the “Loch- R
ner Era” ended in 1937, when the Court upheld a minimum wage law in West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 624.  Making clear it had R
abandoned its earlier view, the Court held that a state satisfies due process when its regula-
tion is “reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the commu-
nity.” West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 391.
280. DAN FRIEDMAN, THE MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 34
(2006).
281. Md. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 120, 311 A.2d 242, 251 (1973)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
282. See, e.g., Governor of Md. v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 426, 370 A.2d 1102, 1111
(1977) (noting that economic regulations are presumed valid unless “arbitrary” or without
“considerations relating to the public welfare by which it can be supported” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
283. FRIEDMAN, supra note 280, at 34. R
284. 74 Op. Md. Att’y Gen. 19, 30 (1989).
285. See infra Part IV.A.2.
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2. The Court of Appeals Has Found Heightened State Constitutional
Protections for Parents in Third Party Custody Disputes, but
Never in Disputes Solely Among Statutorily Recognized
Parents
In McDermott v. Dougherty,286 the Maryland Court of Appeals ap-
plied state protections to parents in third party custody disputes that
may well have exceeded the protections required by the Fourteenth
Amendment.  While noting that a court could apply the “best interests
of the child” standard in a custody dispute among parents,287 the
court found that disputes between a parent and a third party de-
manded a standard more protective of the parent’s rights.288  Specifi-
cally, the court held that third parties seeking custody must show that
the parent is unfit or that exceptional circumstances exist such that
the child would suffer harm if left in the parent’s custody.289  In Mc-
Dermott, a child’s maternal grandparents failed to meet this standard
when they sought custody from the child’s father, who traveled often
as a merchant seaman.290  In so holding, the court never invoked Arti-
cle 24,291 though a visitation dispute just two years later suggested that
the state provision may have been the impetus for the heightened pa-
rental protection.
In Koshko v. Haining,292 the court also applied heightened consti-
tutional protections to parents, this time explicitly relying on Article
24.293 Koshko involved a couple who sought visitation under Mary-
land’s grandparent visitation statute.294  To save the statute from a po-
tential constitutional infraction, the court read into the law a
presumption that parental decisions are in a child’s best interests.295
The court held that the same standards for custody petitions apply to
petitions for visitation: Third parties, such as grandparents, must show
parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances before a court will ap-
286. 385 Md. 320, 869 A.2d 751 (2005).
287. Id. at 354–55, 869 A.2d at 771 (internal quotation marks omitted).
288. Id. at 418–19, 869 A.2d at 808–09.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 323–27, 869 A.2d at 753–55.
291. The court did, however, refer to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Consti-
tution. See, e.g., id. at 331–32, 869 A.2d at 757–58.  The court described the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), in which the Supreme Court
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to include the right to “establish a home and bring
up children.” McDermott, 385 Md. at 332 (alteration in original) (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at
399) (internal quotation marks omitted).
292. 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171 (2007).
293. See infra text accompanying note 298. R
294. Koshko, 398 Md. at 408–10, 921 A.2d at 173–74.
295. Id. at 425–26, 921 A.2d at 183–84.
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ply a “best interests” test to determine whether to grant visitation.296
In so holding, the court made clear that the plurality opinion in Troxel
did not compel the result.297  Instead, the court cited the “full compli-
ment of safeguards extended to liberty interests available under . . .
Article 24.”298
The court’s willingness to find heightened state constitutional
protection in two family law cases suggests its capacity to do so with
statutory de facto parenthood.299  But, closer consideration reveals
dramatic differences between McDermott and Koshko on the one hand,
and any potential dispute involving a de facto parent on the other.
Both McDermott and Koshko involved grandparents, who are third par-
ties under the law.300  Even though a specific statute gives grandpar-
ents the right to petition for visitation,301 the statute does not elevate
grandparents to a level on par with parents.302  Should grandparents
obtain visitation, they remain grandparents but enjoy a share of paren-
tal power.303  By contrast, de facto parents would be more than just
third parties; they would be parents themselves.304  Thus, any visita-
tion dispute would involve not third parties, but rather, two classes of
parents.
While Koshko and McDermott involved challenges to parental au-
thority, the cases’ reasonings are inapposite to a visitation case involv-
ing a de facto parent and a legal parent.  Even so, the court’s language
in Janice M. suggests a concern that any potential legislation guard
legal parents against frivolous interference with their parental deci-
sion making.305  For this reason, lawmakers should add more detail to
any proposed legislation recognizing de facto parenthood.
296. Id. at 440, 921 A.2d at 192.
297. Id. at 443–44, 921 A.2d at 194.
298. Id.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 286–98. R
300. Koshko, 398 Md. at 408, 423, 921 A.2d at 173, 182 (describing the family dispute
between parents and grandparents and one between parents and third parties); McDer-
mott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 323–24, 869 A.2d 751, 753 (2005) (describing the respon-
dents as grandparents who filed a third party custody complaint).
301. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (LexisNexis 2006).
302. Compare id., with H.B. 1241, 427th Sess. (Md. 2010); S.B. 600, 427th Sess. (Md.
2010).
303. FAM. LAW § 9-102.
304. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. R
305. See infra text accompanying note 316. R
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-2\MLR214.txt unknown Seq: 37 18-MAR-11 7:30
2011] JANICE M. V. MARGARET K. 561
B. Adding More Detail to the Proposed Legislation Would More
Effectively Balance the Rights of Legal and De Facto Parents
Although the broad concept of de facto parenthood appears
valid under the state constitution, lawmakers could improve the lan-
guage of proposed legislation to more directly address potential con-
cerns about the concept’s application.  In particular, the Maryland
Court of Appeals has suggested potential problems with the number
of individuals claiming de facto parenthood status.306  The court also
may take issue with the manner by which legal parents consent to
share their parental authority.307  Lawmakers can address both con-
cerns with minor revisions to the proposed legislation.308
1. Lawmakers Should Be More Specific As to Who May Petition for
De Facto Parenthood Status
In the proposed legislation, Maryland lawmakers substantially
limited who may qualify as a de facto parent.  For instance, only indi-
viduals who formed a parent-like relationship with the consent of the
legal parent would have qualified.309  Moreover, those who petitioned
for de facto parenthood status would have had to be willing to accept
all the “duties and obligations” of parents.310  Such requirements not
only limited who could successfully petition for recognition as de facto
parents, but who was likely to petition in the first place.311  In this way,
statutory recognition of de facto parenthood lacks a central concern
of the Koshko court—that third parties too easily could bring an action
in a court to override a parent’s decision.312  By requiring elements
that only a narrow group of people could have satisfied, Maryland
lawmakers drafted legislation that reduced the possibility that a legal
parent could be subject to multiple challenges to his parental author-
ity.  Nonetheless, Maryland lawmakers could add even more details to
limit who may qualify as a de facto parent.
If lawmakers reintroduce the proposed legislation, they should
amend it specifically to require that de facto parents live with a child
306. See infra text accompanying note 314. R
307. See infra Part IV.B.2.
308. See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
309. See supra text accompanying note 17. R
310. See supra text accompanying note 18. R
311. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 2.03, cmt. c (describing the de facto parent require- R
ments as “strict, to avoid unnecessary and inappropriate intrusion into the relationships
between legal parents and their children”).
312. Compare id., with Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 439–40, 921 A.2d 171, 192 (2007)
(explaining the need to protect parental decision making from becoming too “vulnerable
to frustration by third parties”).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-2\MLR214.txt unknown Seq: 38 18-MAR-11 7:30
562 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:525
for a minimum amount of time without expectation of compensation.
In its original form, the proposed legislation required only that the
petitioner demonstrate that the legal parent fostered a parental rela-
tionship between the petitioner and the child, and that the relation-
ship lasted long enough to develop an emotional bond with the
child.313  The bills made no mention of living with the child or what
length of time was sufficient to develop the requisite bond with the
child.314  This ambiguity could encourage anyone who ever fulfilled
any caretaking role for a child to seek court intervention.315  Indeed,
this appeared to be a real concern for the Court of Appeals in Janice
M., where the court noted that not only same-sex partners but grand-
parents, stepparents, and “significant others” could petition for visita-
tion rights as de facto parents.316
The ALI’s Principles provide a useful template for legislation that
would curb this potential flood of litigation.  By requiring a de facto
parent to have lived with the child,317 the Principles prevent individuals
(such as grandparents or neighbors) who may have fulfilled some
caretaking functions but have not lived with the child from claiming
de facto parent status.318  For instance, these individuals may have
picked up the child from school or provided meals while the legal
parents were at work.  Under the broad language of the original pro-
posed legislation, such an individual could have argued the presence
of a parental relationship.319  But by adding a requirement that the
petitioner have lived with the child, a de facto parenthood statute
could more effectively limit the number of potential court challenges
to the legal parent’s authority.
Lawmakers likewise should require that would-be de facto parents
live at least two years with a child and do so without expectation of
financial compensation.320  These additional requirements would pro-
313. H.B. 1241, 427th Sess. (Md. 2010); S.B. 600, 427th Sess. (Md. 2010).
314. See H.B. 1241; S.B. 600 (failing to note any minimum amount of time for a de facto
parent to have been involved in a child’s life).
315. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 2.03, cmt. c(i) (noting that a residence requirement R
is “especially important, since the de facto parent category might otherwise include neigh-
bors, nonresidential relatives, or hired babysitters on whom parents have relief for regular
caretaking functions”).
316. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 686, 948 A.2d 73, 88 (2008).
317. PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 2.03. R
318. See supra note 315. R
319. The proposed legislation required that individuals exercise “parent-like responsibil-
ity for the minor child,” but did not require living with the child.  H.B. 1241(B)(2)(II),
427th Sess. (Md. 2010); S.B. 600 (B)(2)(II), 427th Sess. (Md. 2010).
320. Cf. H.B. 1241(B)(2)(II); S.B. 600 (B)(2)(II) (requiring that those who wish to peti-
tion for de facto parenthood status live with the child for at least two years prior to
petitioning).
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vide more protection for legal parents while not adding any additional
burden to de facto parents.  The requirement of living at least two
years with the child assures that someone who has lived only tempora-
rily in the same household as the child could not use that as the basis
for a de facto parenthood claim.321  If past cases are any indication,
most petitioners for de facto parenthood will base their claim at least
partly on an intimate relationship with the legal parent and child.322
While any time limit on the residence requirement is arbitrary, requir-
ing at least two years makes it more likely that this intimate bond is
significant, and not just a casual relationship.323  Requiring a mini-
mum of two years will encompass most long-term significant others
and stepparents,324 but it would shut out most individuals like neigh-
bors, family friends, and grandparents who do not live with the child.
Adding the complementary requirement that the petitioner live or
take care of the child without the expectation of compensation as-
sures that paid caretakers, such as nannies, lack standing to become
de facto parents.  Thus, incorporating elements of the ALI’s Principles
into proposed legislation makes it more likely that legal parents will
be able to avoid frivolous challenges to their parental authority, while
adding no additional burden to true de facto parents.325
Including these additional details more directly addresses an-
other potential concern of the Court of Appeals—the possibility that a
child could have an endless number of parents.326  The addition of de
facto parents to a child’s life necessarily infringes on the scope of pa-
rental authority for the original parents.  As many scholars have
noted, there is concern that courts may dilute parental rights by mak-
321. See supra note 315 and accompanying text. R
322. Janice M. and Margaret K., for instance, were partners for eighteen years. See supra
note 7 and accompanying text.  Many other cases involving similar claims also have in- R
volved intimate relationships between the legal parent and the individual seeking custody
or visitation with the child. See, e.g., E.N.O v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (child
custody dispute between two women who shared a committed, monogamous relationship
for thirteen years); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (child custody dispute involving
children’s birth mother and her same-sex former domestic partner); Rubano v. DiCenzo,
759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (de facto parenthood claim by the former domestic partner of the
child’s birth mother, who helped raise the child for four years).
323. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, § 2.03, cmt. c(iv) (noting that a two year period in R
which the de facto parent performs caretaking functions is “likely to qualify as significant”).
324. Assuming, of course, the marriage lasts at least two years.
325. See supra note 315 and accompanying text. R
326. See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 686, 948 A.2d 73, 88 (2008) (noting that
not just same-sex partners, but stepparents, grandparents, and “parties in a relationship
with ‘a significant other’” could bring claims as de facto parents).
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ing too many cuts into the “parenthood pie.”327  By limiting the num-
ber of individuals who could seek de facto parenthood status in the
first place, legislators would more directly address this broad concern
about rights dilution.  Amending the legislation also would more ef-
fectively address a related concern—the method by which legal par-
ents must consent to share their rights, and thus, effectively dilute
them.328
2. Adding More Detail to the Legislation Would More Effectively
Assure That Parents Do Not Diminish Their Parental Rights
Without Full Consent
Maryland law already allows parents to share their parental rights,
which effectively dilutes them.329  It does so, however, only when the
legal parent makes clear that she has consented.  Postadoption con-
tact agreements provide an illustration.  As early as 1983, the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals upheld a written agreement between an
adoptive mother and a natural mother that allowed the natural
mother to visit the child after adoption.330  More than twenty years
later, the Maryland legislature codified parents’ ability to enter into
this type of agreement.331  Under the relevant statute, adoptive par-
ents can agree in writing to allow postadoption visitation by the child’s
natural parent or “other relative.”332  Courts must enforce the agree-
ments unless doing so is “not in the adoptee’s best interests.”333  Fail-
ure to comply with the terms of the agreement does not necessarily
nullify the adoption,334 but courts do have the power to refer parties
to mediation to try to resolve disputes.335  Thus, while these agree-
ments do not bestow full parental status on more than two people,
they do allow parents to effectively diminish their constitutional right
327. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 23 (2008)
(“[A]lmost every state has well-established rules for a division of the ‘parenthood pie’ after
dissolution of marriage . . . .”).
328. See infra Part IV.B.2.
329. Indeed, in the context of divorce, the law requires parents to share their rights. See
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203(d) (LexisNexis 2006) (noting that “[n]either parent is
presumed to have any right to custody that is superior to the right of the other parent” and
“[i]f the parents live apart, a court may award custody of a minor child to either parent or
joint custody to both parents”).
330. Weinschel v. Strople, 56 Md. App. 252, 261, 466 A.2d 1301, 1305 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1983).  The court added the caveat that such agreements must be in the child’s best
interest and must not violate public policy. Id.
331. FAM. LAW § 5-308.
332. Id. § 5-308(a).
333. Id. § 5-308(f)(1).
334. Id. § 5-308(d).
335. Id. § 5-308(e).
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to custody by granting other parties the incorporated right of
visitation.336
The proposed de facto parenthood legislation may similarly re-
quire legal parents to share their constitutional authority, but with
one significant distinction.  In postadoption contracts, adoptive par-
ents explicitly agree to share their parental rights.337  With de facto
parenthood, the consent is implied: Instead of signing a written agree-
ment, the legal parent implies consent to future visitation by fostering
a parent-like relationship between the child and the person petition-
ing for de facto parenthood status.338  Because of the presumed con-
stitutionality of postadoption contact agreements in Maryland,339 the
Court of Appeals may raise issues with the manner by which legal par-
ents extend their rights to others through de facto parenthood.
Lawmakers can assuage any potential fears about consent by
amending the proposed statute to include the aforementioned details
that would address how many individuals can petition for de facto
parenthood.  Generally, courts disfavor implied waivers of fundamen-
tal constitutional rights.340  The United States Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged only knowing and voluntary waivers of fundamental
rights.341  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has treated parental rights
differently than other fundamental liberties,342 and de facto
parenthood requires only that a legal parent share his right, not waive
it completely.  This distinction means that Maryland lawmakers need
not meet the high standard of proof regarding the waiver of a true
fundamental right, such as the right to counsel or the right against
self-incrimination.  Nonetheless, adding the requirements of resi-
dency, minimum time, and caretaking without the expectation of pay-
ment decreases the chance that a legal parent will successfully argue
336. The Court of Appeals has deemed visitation a subspecies of custody, which is itself a
constitutional right of parents. See Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 429, 921 A.2d 171, 185
(2007) (noting that “visitation is a species of custody, albeit for a more limited duration”).
337. See supra text accompanying notes 330–32. R
338. H.B. 1241(B)(2)(I), 427th Sess. (Md. 2010); S.B. 600 (B)(2)(I), 427th Sess. (Md.
2010).
339. The Court of Appeals apparently has never considered the constitutionality of such
agreements under federal or state constitutional law.  As of February 2009, more than
twenty other states allowed postadoption contact agreements. ADMIN. ON CHILDREN,
YOUTH & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREE-
MENTS BETWEEN BIRTH AND ADOPTIVE FAMILIES: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 2 & n.2 (2009).
340. E.g., Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 449, 408 A.2d 1302, 1304 (1979) (“Courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds, Walker v. State, 406 Md. 369, 958 A.2d 915 (2008).
341. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (noting that “a waiver is ordinarily
an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”).
342. See supra Part.III.A.2.
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that she did not understand the consequences of fostering a parent-
like relationship between her child and the would-be de facto parent.
Though visitation disputes certainly arise after lengthy relation-
ships,343 the argument that a legal parent did not expect contact to
continue between her child and a former partner after a breakup car-
ries less weight when the person claiming de facto parenthood can
show that he lived with the child for at least two years.344
Although the Maryland Constitution likely encompasses the
broad concept of de facto parenthood, lawmakers should amend their
proposed legislation to more effectively address the potential con-
cerns of the Court of Appeals.  In particular, adding more details
about what constitutes a parental relationship and how long it takes to
develop such a relationship would allay fears that an unlimited num-
ber of people could bring court actions against a legal parent.345  Ad-
ding such details would weaken legal parents’ claims that they did not
knowingly imply consent to future visitation between their children
and those individuals claiming de facto parenthood status as well.346
Because the proposed legislation already would comply with the Fed-
eral Constitution, adding these details would assure survival under a
state constitutional challenge as well.
V. CONCLUSION
As Justice O’Connor observed a decade ago, “[D]emographic
changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average
American family.”347  Today’s narrow legal definition of parenthood,
rooted in traditions that predate divorce and open acceptance of gay
relationships, no longer encompasses the practical realities of family.
Children do not care about legal definitions; they care about the psy-
chological bonds they form with the caregivers in their lives.348  More-
343. One need only consider the facts of the Janice M. case. See generally supra note 322 R
(describing cases from other jurisdictions in which custody and visitation disputes arose
after lengthy relationships).
344. As the Maryland Court of Appeals has noted, “[i]t is an obvious fact, that ties of
blood weaken, and ties of companionship strengthen, by lapse of time; and the prosperity
and welfare of the child depend on the number and strength of these ties, as well as on the
ability to do all which the promptings of these ties compel.”  Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md.
103, 119, 43 A.2d 186, 193 (1945).  Indeed, in custody disputes between parents, Maryland
courts consider length of time apart from a child and thus, necessarily, the time spent with
a child. JOHN F. FADER & RICHARD J. GILBERT, MARYLAND FAMILY LAW § 6-3 (4th ed. 2005).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 326–28. R
346. See supra note 344 and accompanying text. R
347. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (plurality opinion).
348. See Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Main-
tain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 390 (1996) (noting that
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over, the Federal Constitution does not support only one image of a
parent; those adults who take up the responsibilities and duties of par-
ents should have the opportunity to enjoy the same constitutional pro-
tections as natural and adoptive parents.349
Recognizing de facto parenthood is particularly critical to pro-
tecting the interests of same-sex partners, such as Margaret K.  Cur-
rently, gay and lesbian individuals are denied the right to marry in
Maryland.350  Furthermore, their right to adopt children is questiona-
ble.351  Without the ability to achieve the legal status of parent
through marriage or adoption, many gay and lesbian individuals lack
a basic right readily available to heterosexuals.  If for no other reason,
this glaring inequality demands that lawmakers continue their push to
recognize statutory de facto parenthood in Maryland.
“parental influence is not limited to or defined by biology”); see also Smith v. Org. of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (“No one would seriously dispute
that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his
or her care may exist even in the absence of  blood relationship.”).
349. See supra Part III.A.3–4.
350. Maryland law recognizes only marriages between one man and one woman. MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW. § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2006); see also supra note 23. In 2007, the Court R
of Appeals upheld this law against a challenge that it violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the state’s constitution. See generally Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571
(2007).
351. See supra note 6. R
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